A New Method for Protecting Interrelated Time Series with Bayesian Prior Distributions and Synthetic Data by Schneider, Matthew J & Abowd, John M
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Labor Dynamics Institute Centers, Institutes, Programs 
November 2013 
A New Method for Protecting Interrelated Time Series with 
Bayesian Prior Distributions and Synthetic Data 
Matthew J. Schneider 
mjs533@cornell.edu 
John M. Abowd 
Cornell University, jma7@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers, Institutes, Programs at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Labor Dynamics Institute by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
A New Method for Protecting Interrelated Time Series with Bayesian Prior 
Distributions and Synthetic Data 
Abstract 
Organizations disseminate statistical summaries of administrative data via the Web for unrestricted 
public use. They balance the trade-off between confidentiality protection and inference quality. Recent 
developments in disclosure avoidance techniques include the incorporation of synthetic data, which 
capture the essential features of underlying data by releasing altered data generated from a posterior 
predictive distribution. The United States Census Bureau collects millions of interrelated time series 
micro-data that are hierarchical and contain many zeros and suppressions. Rule-based disclosure 
avoidance techniques often require the suppression of count data for small magnitudes and the 
modification of data based on a small number of entities. Motivated by this problem, we use zero-inflated 
extensions of Bayesian Generalized Linear Mixed Models (BGLMM) with privacy-preserving prior 
distributions to develop methods for protecting and releasing synthetic data from time series about 
thousands of small groups of entities without suppression based on the of magnitudes or number of 
entities. We find that as the prior distributions of the variance components in the BGLMM become more 
precise toward zero, confidentiality protection increases and inference quality deteriorates. We evaluate 
our methodology using a strict privacy measure, empirical differential privacy, and a newly defined risk 
measure, Probability of Range Identification (PoRI), which directly measures attribute disclosure risk. We 
illustrate our results with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators. 
Keywords 
synthetic data, zero-inflated mixed models, informative prior distributions, probability of range 
identification, PORI, statistical disclosure limitation, SDL, empirical differential privacy, big data privacy, 
Bayesian 
Comments 
Published as Schneider, Matthew J. and John M. Abowd “A New Method for Protecting Interrelated Time 
Series with Bayesian Prior Distributions and Synthetic Data,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series A (2015) DOI:10.1111/rssa.12100. 
The authors wish to acknowledge funding received through NSF grants BCS 0941226 (CDI), SES 9978093, 
ITR 0427889, SES 0922005, and SES 1131848 (NCRN). 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/20 
1A New Method for Protecting Interrelated
Time Series with Bayesian Prior Distributions
and Synthetic Data
Matthew J. Schneider1 and John M. Abowd2
Abstract Organizations disseminate statistical summaries of administrative data via the Web for unrestricted
public use. They balance the trade-off between confidentiality protection and inference quality. Recent developments
in disclosure avoidance techniques include the incorporation of synthetic data, which capture the essential features
of underlying data by releasing altered data generated from a posterior predictive distribution. The United States
Census Bureau collects millions of interrelated time series micro-data that are hierarchical and contain many zeros
and suppressions. Rule-based disclosure avoidance techniques often require the suppression of count data for small
magnitudes and the modification of data based on a small number of entities. Motivated by this problem, we use
zero-inflated extensions of Bayesian Generalized Linear Mixed Models (BGLMM) with privacy-preserving prior
distributions to develop methods for protecting and releasing synthetic data from time series about thousands of small
groups of entities without suppression based on the of magnitudes or number of entities. We find that as the prior
distributions of the variance components in the BGLMM become more precise toward zero, confidentiality protection
increases and inference quality deteriorates. We evaluate our methodology using a strict privacy measure, empirical
differential privacy, and a newly defined risk measure, Probability of Range Identification (PoRI), which directly
measures attribute disclosure risk. We illustrate our results with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce
Indicators.
1Address for Correspondence: Samuel C. Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853: Email:
mjs533@cornell.edu
2Department of Economics, Department of Statistical Sciences, and Labor Dynamics Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA.
Email: john.abowd@cornell.edu
We acknowledge funding from NSF grants BCS 0941226, SES 9978093, ITR 0427889, SES 0922005, and SES 1131848. We thank
Stephen Fienberg, Sachin Gupta, Sharan Jagpal, Aleksandra B. Slavkovic, and Lars Vilhuber for helpful comments. The scientific inputs
and programming used in this article have been deposited in a curated data repository run by the Cornell University Libraries http://
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/20/.
2Keywords: synthetic data; zero-inflated mixed models; informative prior distributions; administrative data; statis-
tical disclosure limitation (SDL); empirical differential privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Various organizations across the globe disseminate statistical summaries of administrative data via the
Web for unrestricted public use. These products describe individuals or businesses either in micro-data
or tabular format. Disclosure avoidance methods (also called statistical disclosure limitation methods) are
required to enable dissemination beyond the trusted users.
Agencies choose disclosure avoidance methods to balance “the level of protection provided and the
effects on the ability of users to draw valid inferences” (Duncan et al. 1993, pages 10-11). For example,
in 2003, the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program released the
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWIs), a collection of highly detailed local labor market time series
with 32 economic measures (e.g., the number of jobs created, accession, jobs destroyed, and separations)
categorized by gender, age, race, ethnicity, education, U.S. county, U.S. state, North American Industrial
Classification (NAICS), and business ownership. At the most detailed level, the micro-data contain many
zeros. Current disclosure avoidance rules suppress the publication of some of these data, a problematic
method because it degrades the ability of users and researchers to draw valid inferences about the
underlying micro-data. Another challenge is that formal privacy measures (e.g., differential privacy, Dwork
2006) do not apply well to very detailed data sets where many of the candidate publication cells are empty,
such as the QWI data, because the level of protection they impose is too great for meaningful inference
(Abowd and Schneider 2011). Consequently, more realistic protection methods and measures are needed
for models that accurately capture the information present in such detailed data sets.
Hotz et al. (1998) conducted a comprehensive review of agencies around the world and found that
disclosure avoidance techniques varied in practice. In the United States, the Federal Committee on Statis-
tical Methodology, which is composed of members from the principal statistical agencies of the federal
government, maintains a statistical policy paper (FCSM 2005) that catalogues the disclosure limitation
practices of these official statistics publishers. International statistical agencies have also discussed these
issues regularly. See OECD (2012).
Agencies frequently used suppression, swapping, sub-sampling, coarsening, top coding for continuous
variables, limitation of geographic details, aggregation, and discretization of continuous variables, as well
3as newer methods like controlled tabulation, noise infusion, and limited synthesis (sometimes called “blank
and impute”). The disclosure avoidance technique used depends on the type of data being protected. For
tabular data, such as count tables, applicable methods included cell suppression, interval publication, cell
rounding, cell perturbation, and controlled tabulation. For micro-data, methods included noise addition,
noise multiplication, suppression, coarsening, aggregation, and swapping. However, many of these methods
overprotect and therefore, researchers who require more detail in order to make valid inferences on micro-
data often request, and are granted, restricted access via agency supervised enclaves. For a very complete
summary of methods see Duncan, et al. (2011).
Recent developments in advanced disclosure avoidance techniques for micro-data include noise infusion
(OECD 2012) and synthetic data (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008; Reiter 2005b; Kohnen and Reiter 2009).
The first large-scale use of noise infusion in any official statistical product occurred in 2003 on the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators (Abowd et al. 2009). Drechsler and Reiter (2010)
showed improvements by using synthetic data with classification and regression trees compared to common
disclosure avoidance techniques like sampling.
Rubin (1993) and Little (1993) proposed the use of fully and partially synthetic data in the same
special issue of the Journal of Official Statistics. Rubin’s method was based on multiple imputation, using
a Bayesian model to fit the confidential data, then releasing samples in which all released variables were
draws from the posterior predictive distribution, and thus not actual respondent data. Little’s method,
known as partially synthetic data, used similar methods but only replaced some of the variables or some
of the records with synthetic data before release.
Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) performed the first formal privacy analysis with synthetic data that
was adopted by a U.S. statistical agency (the Census Bureau). Their method was developed for sparse
multinomial data. The analysis was formal because the released data were provably protected with a level
of differential privacy, a theoretical concept in which the relative change in knowledge produced by the
release (the posterior odds ratio) is bounded. In related work, Abowd et al. (2012) proposed eliminating
the limited suppressions that often used in conjunction with noise infusion by combining a synthetic
data model with multiplicative noise distortion applied directly to the micro-data. Abowd and Schneider
(2011) added formal noise directly to the parameter estimates of a Linear Mixed Model without the
use of synthetic data. They found that valid inferences on detailed data sets like the QWIs were not
possible when differential privacy for a data model with bounded release variables and a limited number
4of parameters. Consequently, Abowd, Schneider, and Vilhuber (2013) relaxed the definition of differential
privacy to empirical differential privacy, which bounds the posterior odds ratios of a Bayesian model with
and without the most influential observation. They used a non-informative prior to measure empirical
differential privacy for a normally distributed dependent variable, but did not protect the Bayesian model;
that is, they did not provide a method for controlling the privacy protection in the Bayesian model by
direct manipulation of the prior distributions.
Building upon these recent developments, our research protects the best fitting Bayesian synthetic data
models for detailed data sets (i.e., those with thousands of categories, time series, and non-normally
distributed dependent variables) with informative prior distributions.
This paper proposes a method that would allow disclosure avoidance procedures at statistical agencies
to be applied to the release of detailed micro-data, using a formal protection method that is incorporated
into the estimation of Bayesian statistical model of the confidential data. The proposed approach may be
more efficient compared than current rule-based procedures, which require small and sometimes extremely
large values in micro-data to be suppressed even after other protections have been applied. Our proposed
modeling approach randomly generates small counts (including zero) using synthetic data from a zero-
inflated mixed model, thereby obviating the need to suppress the data observation. Mixed models with
a zero-inflated structure have demonstrated better fits than fixed-effects models with zero-inflation or
mixed-effect models without (Hall 2000).
We also propose a new measure called the Probability of Range Identification (PoRI), which protects
lumpy zeros and large counts by ensuring the magnitude of released synthetic data is not usually close
to the true data. An alternative approach in the literature measures the probability of record linkage in
a data set (Reiter 2005a), but our approach differs in that we use a real-valued dependent variable. An
agency can use the PoRI along with the existing measure of empirical differential privacy to decide the
desired degree of protection.
Although the method is designed to be applied directly to the confidential micro-data, and then used
to create a synthetic version of those data for publication, we test all of our procedures on the public-use
Quarterly Workforce Indicators, which are actually tabulations of the underlying micro-data. Our reasons
are two-fold. First, this allows us to test and refine the methods in a scientific forum where we can freely
share both the input and output data products. To this end, the scientific inputs and programming have
been deposited in a curated data repository run by the Cornell University Libraries http://digitalcommons.
5ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/XX/.
Methodologically, we present a solution to the disclosure avoidance problem by using a single proba-
bility model with a privacy-preserving prior distribution whose hyper-parameters are fixed before there is
any model estimation. Our use of prior distributions on the variance components of a Bayesian GLMM
with zero inflation is a new disclosure limitation method. Further, unlike previous research we neither
add noise to parameter estimates ex-post model estimation (Abowd and Schneider 2011) nor to the data
directly (Abowd et al. 2012). We are also the first to apply empirical differential privacy to the class of
Bayesian Generalized Linear Mixed Models (BGLMM), which accommodates non-normally distributed
dependent variables. We also propose a new privacy metric (PoRI) that can be used to control the posterior
probability of attribute disclosure.
This paper proceeds by introducing the model and its corresponding prior distributions in Section II. In
Section III, we explain empirical differential privacy in relation to our disclosure avoidance methodology,
and define PoRI. Then, in Section IV, we apply our disclosure avoidance methodology to the Census
Bureau’s QWI and discuss the results. Finally, in Section V, we conclude.
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION
A. The Bayesian Zero-Inflated Poisson Mixed Model
Rubin (1993) proposed the use of fully synthetic data constructed using multiple draws from the
Bayesian posterior predictive distribution fitted to the underlying confidential data. We use synthetic
data produced from a Bayesian Zero-Inflated Poisson Mixed Model, which has several advantages in
our application. The first is that mixed effect models are currently used by many statistical agencies for
estimating small geographical areas and therefore, our privacy routines can be readily incorporated into
procedures designed to protect such data. The second is that our model is an extension of a Generalized
Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) and ,as a result, the distribution of the dependent variable can be altered
with little difficulty.The third is that as the prevalence of zeros in our dependent variable increases, the
zero-inflation parameter mixes more quickly and computation time is decreased (Hadfield 2010).
Following specification in Hadfield (2010), we model the dependent variable, yi, for i = 1, 2, ...N , using
a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) likelihood. The data have been stacked so that the first time series, relating to
a particular industry and geography, is in the first T rows, followed by the next time series, which relates
to the next industrial and geographic unit in rows T + 1 to 2T , and so forth. We construct the appropriate
design matrices below to incorporate the industrial and geographic structure into the estimation.
6The ZIP likelihood is formed using two latent variables. The first latent variable is the Poisson random
variable (η˙) with link function is on the log scale. The second latent variable is the zero inflation random
variable (η¨) with link function on the logit scale. A link function establishes the relationship between
the mean of the dependent variable and the latent variable, which is modeled using a linear mixed-effect
predictor. The two latent variables have the structure
η˙i = x
T
i β + z
T
i u+ ξ1i (1)
η¨i = ξ2i (2)
where β is the vector of fixed effects in the Poisson linear predictor, u is the vector of random effects
in the Poisson linear predictor, xi is a row of the design matrix for the fixed effects, zi is a row of the
design matrix for the random effects, ξ1i is the linear prediction error for the Poisson linear predictor, and
ξ2i is the linear prediction error for the zero-inflation latent variable. Notice that there are neither fixed
nor random effects, only a prediction error, for the latent zero-inflation random variable in equation (2).
The parametric structure is completed by specifying the joint distribution of
[
βT uT ξT1 ξ
T
2
]T
as

β
u
ξ1
ξ2

∼MVN


0
0
0
0

,

B 0 0 0
0 G 0 0
0 0 R1 0
0 0 0 R2


(3)
B = Idim(β)
G =

σ2c1Idim(c1) 0 0
0 ... 0
0 0 σ2cmIdim(cm)
 (4)
R1 = σ
2
ξ1
IN
R2 = σ
2
ξ2IN
We have assumed that the random effects are independent with constant variances σ2c1 , σ
2
c2
, . . . , σ2cm .
The number of random effect categories, m, is determined by our model selection procedures. Serial de-
pendence among the individual time series is modeled by vectors of lagged regressors, and is incorporated
7into the fixed effects. In the Poisson process, X is the fixed effects design matrix and Z is the random
effects design matrix. The rows of X and Z are designated xTi and z
T
i , respectively.
The distribution of the dependent variable relies is derived directly from the link functions and the latent
random variables η˙i and η¨i. Specifically, the total probability that yi = 0 is the sum of the probability
that yi = 0 from the zero-inflation process and the probability that yi = 0 from the Poisson process,
given that it did not come from the zero-inflation process. The probability that yi > 0 depends on the
probabilities from the Poisson process, given that it was not zero from the zero-inflation process. Formally,
the equations are
Pr [yi = 0 |xi, zi ] = exp(η¨)
1 + exp(η¨)
+
(
1− exp(η¨)
1 + exp(η¨)
)
fPois
(
yi = 0| exp(η˙i)
∣∣xTi , zTi ) (5)
Pr
[
yi = 1, 2, ..
∣∣xTi , zTi ] = (1− exp(η¨)1 + exp(η¨)
)
fPois(yi| exp(η˙i)
∣∣xTi , zTi (6)
E
[
yi
∣∣xTi , zTi ,β,u] = µi = exp(η˙i)(1− exp(η¨)1 + exp(η¨)
)
(7)
To complete the Bayesian specification of the model, we state the prior distributions of the parameters
β0, B, G, R1, and R2, respectively. The prior mean, β0, of the fixed effects is always zero, and its
prior covariance matrix is the identity, as specified above, so there are no hyper-parameters for the fixed
effects. The priors for all of the variance components in the random effects and prediction errors are Inverse
Gamma. The specification of these prior distributions is used to control the formal privacy properties of
the model. We discuss these in the next subsection.
B. The Privacy-preserving Prior Distributions
We use the prior distributions on the variance components to control the privacy properties of our
protected synthetic data. We focus primarily on the prior distributions of the random effects, u, because
estimated random effects often rely on only a few observations, and our prior work suggests that it is the
contribution of influential observations to an estimated random effect that cause the empirical differential
privacy limits to move. The random effects model an observation’s deviation from the global mean of
the model. Therefore, the estimated random effects are likely to have a larger disclosure risk than the
fixed effects, each of which usually depends on a large number of observations, none of which is very
influential. The Bayesian GLMM controls the amount of information contained in the estimated random
8effects by shrinking the estimated of the random effects toward the global mean of our model.
The prior distributions of the variances of the random effects, σ2c1 , σ
2
c2
, ...σ2cm , in the G matrix are
each assumed independent with an Inverse-Gamma distribution. The Inverse-Gamma random variable is
non-negative with hyper-parameters ν and V and its density is
σ2c1 ∼ IG(Vc1 , νc1), .., σ2cm ∼ IG(Vcm , νcm) (8)
p
(
σ2cr |Vcr , νcr
)
=
|νcrVcr |
νcr
2
2
νcr
2 Γ
(νcr
2
) |σ2cr |− νcr+22 exp(−12 νcrVcrσ2cr
)
(9)
for r = 1, . . .m. As the variances of the random effects are scaled toward zero,the linear predictor
shrinks toward the global mean. Consequently, the estimated random effects are less informative about
the specific category (in our data a geographic unit), affording more protection in a manner that we
formalize below. The choices of νcr and Vcr define the strength of the informative prior, Pm, which we
then compare to a non-informative prior P0 in our empirical application. To increase the protective strength
of the prior, we set the prior mean (Hadfield 2010), (νcrVcr)/(νcr − 2), of the variance components near
zero with small variance, (ν2crV
2
cr)/((νcr − 2)2
(
νcr
2
− 2)). Specifically, as the degree of belief parameter
νcr →∞, the prior mean approaches Vcr and the prior variance approaches zero, given νcr > 4. The two
hyper-parameters interact in determining the location and spread of the prior distribution on the variance
component variances. Our approach varies both parameters so that the mean of the prior distribution stays
fixed near zero and the variance of the prior distribution tightens.
The prior distributions on the fixed effects, β, and error variances, σ2ξ1 and σ
2
ξ2
, are kept relatively
diffuse, but proper, because their corresponding posterior estimates depend on many observations, and
influential points move them relatively little. These prior distributions and densities are
σ2ξ1 ∼ IG(Vξ1 , νξ1), σ2ξ2 ∼ IG(Vξ2 , νξ2),β ∼MVN(0, I) (10)
p(β |I ) = (2pi)− dim(β)/2 exp
(
−1
2
βTβ
)
(11)
p
(
σ2ξs|Vs, νs
)
=
|νsVs| νs2
2
νs
2 Γ
(
νs
2
) |σ2ξs|− νs+22 exp
(
−1
2
νsVs
σ2ξs
)
(12)
for s = 1, 2.
9III. PRIVACY MEASURES
We define two measures of privacy in this section. The first is -empirical differential privacy, which
bounds the posterior odds ratios of a Bayesian model with and without the most influential observation.
The second is a new privacy metric called the probability of range identification (PoRI), which measures
the posterior probability of inferring a close range of the confidential dependent variable given the synthetic
data. Our empirical section investigates how these change when we vary the hyper-parameters in the prior
distributions.
A. Empirical Differential Privacy for Bayesian Models
Empirical differential privacy for Bayesian Models was originally defined by Abowd, Schneider, and
Vilhuber (2013), and details for calculation can be found in that paper. The value  represents a bound
across all observations in a given data set and is therefore an worst-case measure of privacy breeches. It
is a highly sensitive to outliers and influential data points. From an inference point of view,  measures
the bounds of the logarithm of the posterior odds ratios of all released estimates produced from two
models. The first model includes all observations and the second model excludes the most influential
observation. Candidate influential observations are selected by calculating the posterior mean residuals
on the response scale. We expect  to change based upon the selection of prior distribution. Empirical
differential privacy can be used on any Bayesian GLMM; however, we focus on the Bayesian ZIP mixed
model in our empirical section since it is the best fitting model for the our application.
B. Probability of Range Identification (PoRI)
PoRI measures the posterior probability of inferring a sensitive range of a real-valued yi given the
synthetic data and knowledge of the design matrices, X and Z. We expect this measure to be a major
concern at statistical agencies using noise infusion currently multiply the input variables by a noise factor
formed such that no input value is within a certain percent of its true value (Abowd et al. 2012). Although
multiplicative noise protects the data at face value, regression-based methods could possibly recover true
values.
Suppose the statistical agency wishes to protect the confidential dependent variable, y, by releasing
synthetic data ys. Further suppose that yi follows the Zero-inflated Poisson process defined above. The
fixed effects design matrix X and the random effects design matrix Z are assumed known. This is
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a reasonable assumption because design matrices in our empirical application consist of industries and
geographies which are public knowledge. The synthetic data is assumed known, but the confidential
values of y (i.e., inside the firewall, not released) are not known. The agency chooses the sensitive range
of disclosure of yi for each i, yi,b1 to yi,b2 and measures PoRI for each observation as
PoRIi =
∫ yi,b2
yi,b1
∫
p(yi|θ,X,Z,ys)p(θ = (σ2,β,u)|X,Z,ys)dθdyi (13)
It is important for the agency to set meaningful thresholds. We suggest a rule-based framework (e.g.,
yi± 10% of yi or yi± 10% of group standard deviation). To simulate PoRI for each i, first we recover
estimates of the model parameters given the synthetic data and design matrices. Then, we generate T
draws of each i from the posterior predictive distribution of yi which is conditional on our estimates of
the model parameters and the known design matrices. We count the proportion of posterior samples from
yi,b1 to yi,b2 and set it equal to PoRIi. If there are no posterior samples in that range, PoRIi = 0, and
there is no chance of inferring a close range of yi.
There are several differences between PoRIi and . First,  is found by empirically searching the
maximal change over all parameters and influential observations, but PoRIi is calculated for every
observation. Second,  was measured from posterior samples of model parameters, whereas PORI was
measured from the posterior predictive distribution of the dependent variable. However, both a low value
of  and a low value of PoRIi are associated with higher degrees of privacy.
IV. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
A. The Quarterly Workforce Indicators
The Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWIs) are a collection of detailed local labor market indicators
comprising 32 economic measures (e.g., the number of jobs created, number of jobs destroyed, number
of workers hired, number of workers separated, earnings, etc.) categorized by gender, age, race, ethnicity,
education level, U.S. county, U.S. state, NAICS industry classification, and owner. These data are published
online at http://qwiexplorer.ces.census.gov/ and are available to the public. At the U.S. county by NAICS
sector aggregation level, there are over 50,000 time series (two million observations) for each indicator.
Further disaggregation by ethnicity, age, gender, or education level result in tens of millions of time
series. Currently, much of these data at the disaggregated levels are either not released because one of
the indicators fails a publication quality standard that applies to indicators based on just a few jobs. One
11
economic indicator is the number of job creations. Researchers can request the number of job creations by
selecting from the available categories. For example, a researcher may request the number of job creations
last quarter for Cuyahoga County, Ohio in the manufacturing sector.
Job creations are measured on an establishment level and are defined as JCt = max(0, Et−Bt) where
Et is the number of people employed at the end-of-quarter. A person is considered end-of-quarter employed
if the wage record submitted for that job (person, employer combination) has earnings greater of at least
$1.00 in quarters t and t + 1 for a given employer. Bt is the number of beginning-of-quarter employed
persons. A person is considered beginning-of-quarter employed if the wage record submitted for that job
has earnings of at least $1.00 in quarters t − 1 and t for a given employer. Since each establishment
belongs to a county c and industry j, Bt and Et are aggregated to the county by industry level for all
establishments in the indicated industry that operate in that, sometimes very small, geographic area.
When the current disclosure avoidance protocol would have suppressed a value, thus restricting the
disaggregated information available to the public, our method releases protected synthetic value. In
addition, even when the current protocol would have released a noisy value, our proposed method releases
the synthetic value.
We evaluate the release of the synthetic data, based on a Bayesian GLMM with a privacy-protecting
prior, by comparing it to data that would be released from best fitting Bayesian model with a very diffuse
prior. Thus, we examine the trade-off between the goodness of fit (e.g., the Deviation Information Criterion
(DIC) and the correlation of fitted vales to true values) and disclosure risk (e.g., empirical differential
privacy and PoRI) of the synthetic data. For small values including zero, our synthesizer generates a
small value, which can be zero, using synthetic data from the appropriate estimated ZIP model, thereby
obviating the need to suppress the observation. For data with large magnitudes, we randomly generate a
different value, again using the appropriate posterior predictive distribution. Note that in the application
to actual micro-data, this would be equivalent protecting the value of a large business. In the published
QWI, this protection isn’t necessary because the data do not relate to a single establishment, but since
we are using the QWI to simulate the relevant micro-data, we apply the protection to demonstrate its
effectiveness.
We evaluate our proposed approach using job creations data for the state of Ohio. We use these data
at the NAICS sector by county level. Although the published data are clearly not confidential, we use
them as proxies for the actual confidential data because they have a similar statistical structure to the
12
underlying confidential data.
Our dependent variable y, consists of elements yjct, the count of job creations in NAICS sector j for
county c in quarter t, where t = 1, 2, ..., 80 from 1990:q2 to 2010:q1), and N is the total number of
observations. X is the design matrix for the fixed effects (industries and lagged regressors) and Z is
the design matrix for the random effects (counties and interactions chosen by model selection). At the
current level of aggregation, we treat the observed job creations (y) as confidential and the synthetic
values (ys) as the proposed non-confidential release-data produced by our model. Since the structure at
the county-by-industry level of aggregation is the same as in the micro-data, we expect our results to be
generalizable for the actual confidential micro data. In Ohio, at the current aggregation level, there are
N = 51, 582 observations, 88 counties, 19 industries, and approximately a 3.4% prevalence ratio of zeros
which quickly increases with additional levels of disaggregation.
B. Model Selection
We performed model selection procedures across three levels of hierarchical interactions. Table I displays
the DIC and goodness of fit statistics between y and the model fitted values (yˆ) for seven candidate models.
DIC is defined as the sum of negative two times the log likelihood, the effective number of parameters,
and a fixed constant (see Hadfield 2010 for the ZIP-specific formulas). The conditional correlation is the
correlation between y and yˆ = E(y|βˆ, uˆ),where βˆ and uˆ are the estimated posterior means of β and
u, respectively. The truncated correlation is also the correlation between y and E(y|βˆ, uˆ) except that
E(y|βˆ, uˆ) is truncated at 8,000. The synthetic fit measures the correlation between ys and y, where ys
is a draw from the posterior predictive distribution of y given the original y, X and Z.
For all models, we set a particular proper, relatively non-informative prior P1 as the reference prior that
would be used in an unfettered analysis of the original, confidential data. For P1, we set the prior mean
of β to 0 with a variance of I . We set the prior of σ2ξ1 to have a degree of belief parameter ν = 10 and a
centrality parameter of V = 1, whereas, ν = 10 and V = 1 was set for the rest of the variance components
of the random effects. One issue in estimation is that the variance component related to the zero inflation
parameter, σ2ξ2 , cannot be factored out from σ
2
ξ1
when there is no data information to distinguish zeros
sampled form the Poisson from zeros sampled from the inflation process (Hadfield, 2010). Therefore, we
fixed σ2ξ2 = 1.
We selected the model with three-way interactions because it had the lowest DIC and highest correla-
tions. The chosen model results in the estimation of 8,356 fixed and random effects, which means that
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Goodness of Fit Statistics for Candidate Models
Model DIC Conditional Truncated Synthetic Number
Fit Fit Fit of Cells
No Interactions 372, 944 3.9% 75.0% 5.1% 113
County by Quarter 372, 969 5.9% 75.7% 7.3% 465
County by Industry 371, 403 4.3% 77.3% 4.7% 1, 684
Quarter by Industry 372, 532 58.2% 77.2% 51.4% 189
All 2-Way 370, 104 79.7% 81.5% 75.0% 2, 112
3-Way and All 2-Way 369, 350 82.5% 82.9% 78.1% 8, 356
Notes: Models in column (1) refer to the specification of the design of the fixed and
random effects in equation (1). County is the geographic county identifier. Quarter is the
quarterly seasonal. In the interaction models, Industry is the NAICS sub-sector. 2-way
interactions involving industry are random effects. All specifications are hierarchical.
TABLE I
there is about one parameter for every six observations. Additionally, there are seven variance components.
The large differences between the truncated correlations and the conditional correlations are due to the 12
observations in Ohio with more than 8,000 job creations in a quarter. These were also the observations
that produced highest values of , the empirical differential privacy.
For the best fitting model with prior P1, we searched over all posterior mean residuals and gathered 10
candidate influential observations to use for the measurement of . The deletion of the most influential
observation produced an  as high as 2.8, but results for the other 9 influential observations ranged from
0.7 to 1.5. Since  is defined as the maximum across all observations, the empirical −differential privacy
was 2.8, which is a bound on the posterior odds of 16.4:1. The observation, i = 41, 399, which determined
 was a large magnitude observation and not a zero. It had 52,019 job creations in a county-industry sector
(county: Cuyahoga, NAICS sector: Health Care and Social Assistance) which typically averaged 6,600.
This observation occurred in the last quarter of 2009. For comparison, all the county-NAICS sectors in
Ohio averaged 167 job creations per quarter with a standard deviation of 569.
Synthetic data only slightly lowered the fit for the very best fitting models with non-informative priors,
but would permit the release of protected data with similar variation and fit as the real data. The introduction
of synthetic data also allowed the release of values of different magnitudes for true zeros in our data and
for high magnitude observations. According to Table I, the synthetic data have a correlation of 78.1%
with the actual data.
We analyzed one hundred draws of synthetic data from the posterior predictive distribution of the model
in the last row of Table I. This was the best-fitting model on the DIC criterion. We found the following
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key differences between the synthetic and actual data. The overall prevalence of zeros in the actual data
was 3.4% compared to an average overall prevalence in the synthetic data of 2.2%. Most of the zeros in
the best fitting model were picked up by the Poisson process instead of the Zero-inflation parameter. If
this model were applied to data with a higher prevalence of zeros, we would expect the Zero-inflation
parameter to contribute more to the generation of zeros than the Poisson process.
The maximum number of job creations in the actual data was 52,019 compared to an average maximum
number of job creations in the synthetic data of 15,820. The mean and standard deviation of the number
of actual job creations were 167 and 569, respectively, compared to 162 and 509 in the synthetic data.
To further explore potential limitations of the synthetic data, we regressed the actual and synthetic job
creation data on a constant and time trend, deliberately suppressing all of the other effects, including
seasonal effects. The trend coefficient estimated from the actual data is −0.62 (±0.25). In the synthetic
data, the average trend coefficient is −1.17 (±0.21). This result suggests that a more sophisticated
modeling of the time effects might be of interest, although there is still substantial overlap in the 95%
confidence intervals for the trend coefficient.
C. Model Protection
We protected the model and its resulting synthetic data by shrinking the variance components toward
zero. Tables II and III demonstrate the trade-off between privacy and model fit for protective prior
distributions. We set V = .001 and varied our degree of belief hyper-parameter ν. All prior distributions
on the variances of the random effects were set equal. For PoRI, we considered a 10% range around
each yi as a sensitive range. PoRI was approximated by generating 1,000 synthetic values of yi for each
observation and summing an indicator variable on the sensitive range of yi.
Results indicate that as the priors become more precise, and therefore shrank the released data more
towards the global mean,  and the median PoRI decreased. The results for V = 0.001 and ν = 8, 000
showing ranges of  and the median PoRI for four different models appear in Table III.
Choosing a level of protection always involves trade-offs between the privacy parameters and the
goodness of fit of the released model. If the agency chose to release the best-fitting model based on
prior P1, then the released synthetic data would have goodness of fit shown in Row (1) of Table II and
the privacy properties shown in Column (2) of Table III. Many agencies might consider  in the range
(2.1, 2.8) and PoRI in the range (14%, 15%) to be acceptable. The decision to truncate would not very
much affect the data quality.
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Protective Priors on the Variance Components of the Random Effects
V ν DIC Conditional Truncated Synthetic Median
Fit Correlation Correlation PoRI
1.000 10 369,350 82.5% 82.9% 78.1% 14%
.0010 2000 370,494 51.0% 79.7% 50.8% 12%
.0010 4000 372,809 18.8% 77.0% 18.8% 4%
.0010 6000 373,030 13.0% 76.5% 13.0% 4%
.0010 8000 373,193 8.1% 76.2% 8.1% 4%
.0010 10000 373,123 6.6% 75.8% 6.5% 3%
.0001 3000 376,868 3.1% 67.6% 3.1% 0%
Notes: Row (1) refers to the best fitting model from Table I. Rows (2)-(7)
refer to the same statistical model with successively tighter prior distributions.
TABLE II
Privacy Measures for Baseline and Best Models for QWI
Measure/Model Best Model with P1 Best Model with P5
 (2.1, 2.8) (0.72, 0.83)
Median PoRI (14%, 15%) (3.9%, 4.0%)
Average DIC 369, 350 373, 193
Notes: The best model with P1 is Row (1) of Table II. The
best model with P5 is Row (5) of Table II. The influential
observation determining the bound on  is row 41,399 in the
archival data set.
TABLE III
If, on the other hand, the agency wanted tighter privacy protection, then it could use the following
strategy. Using the best fitting Bayesian ZIP mixed model with prior P5 (V = .001, ν = 8, 000), we were
able to increase privacy compared to the same model with a non-informative prior. This can be seen by
comparing Row (5) of Table II to Row (1). However, degradation in model fit appeared severe, as can
be seen in the same comparison of rows. The degradation in fit was due to the 12 observations that had
actual values of yi greater than 8,000 job creations. The strength of the prior required to mitigate the
effects of these observations pulls all of the variances of the random effects towards zero with a high
prior degree of belief (controlled by the ν hyper-parameters). Table II shows that after truncating these
observations, the correlation is over 76% when V = 0.001, ν = 8, 000. Compared to the model that only
included counties as random effects (Row (1) of Table I which had an  of 1.7, a median PoRI of 5%,
and a truncated correlation of 75%), we were able to increase privacy and maintain about the same fit
quality. Overall, our proposed methodology greatly increased privacy while maintaining a decent fit after
excluding the 12 highest observations (less than 0.03% of observations).
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V. CONCLUSION
We implemented a protection strategy based on Zero-inflated Poisson extensions of Bayesian Gen-
eralized Linear Mixed Models with privacy-preserving prior distributions to produce synthetic data for
related time series from thousands of small groups. Our method demonstrated the trade-off between
producing synthetic data with analytical features close to the original data (effectively the synthetic data
that would be produced from the best Bayesian analysis of the actual confidential data) and synthetic data
produced using privacy-preserving prior distributions. We applied our methodology to the strict privacy
measure of empirical differential privacy and a newly defined privacy measure, PORI, which controls the
attribute disclosure risk of each observation in the data set. We found that as the prior distributions of the
variance components become more precise toward zero, privacy increased on all accounts as compared to
a model with a non-informative prior. As an alternative to current rule-based procedures, which include
the suppression of data, our research allows agencies to use disclosure avoidance procedures to release
their detailed data using a protection method incorporated into the estimation of a formal probability
model. Agencies could, therefore, balance “the level of protection provided and the effects on the ability
of users to draw valid inferences” (Duncan et al. 1993) by adjusting their preference for privacy within
a prior distribution.
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